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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 1547 5 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND MATERIAL FACTS 
The material facts and statement of the case are set forth 
in full in Appellant's initial brief (see pp. 1-7 of Appellant's 
Brief) . 
The Respondents have agreed that the facts set forth in 
Appellant's initial Brief are accurate (seep. 3 of Respondents' 
Brief) . Respondents, however, have added their own statement of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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facts which sets forth at length the parties' respective claims 
to title to the one-half mineral interest in dispute (see p. 3 of 
Respondents' Brief). Title, however, is not at issue on this 
appeal. This is a statute of limitation case. 
It must be stressed again, that the lower court rendered 
it's decision on Respondents' statute of limitation Motion for 
Summary Judgment without ever determining or even considering the 
validity or relative priority of the parties' alleged titles to 
the one-half mineral interest in question. Accordingly, any 
facts on this appeal with respect to how the parties obtained 
their respective titles are irrelevant. 
Analysis of the parties' respective claims of title to the 
subject mineral interest is appropriate at trial only where 
evidence pertaining to the parties' alleged titles can be adducea 
by all parties. 
This is exactly what Appellant seeks on appeal: Remand to 
the trial court for trial on the ultimate issue of who holds 
valid title to the disputed one-half mineral interest. 
On appeal, the only issues before this Court are as follows: 
(1) Whether Miller & Viele is in actual possession of the 
disputed one-half interest through it's Lessee, Chevron, which is 
daily extracting oil and gas at the wellhead. Such actual 
possession entitles Miller & Viele, pursuant to the applicable 
language in the tax title Statutes of Limitation, to a trial on 
• I 
the issue of the validity and relative priority of the parties 
titles to the one-half mineral interest in question, and 
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(2) Whether the case should be remanded for trial on the 
issue also of a compromise and settlement having been reached in 
1946 by Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest whereby Dye's 
predecessors acquiesced in Miller & Viele's title to the one-half 
mineral interest now in dispute while receiving from Miller & 
Viele undisputed title to the remaining one-half mineral interest 
and the surface estate of the NW\NE\. This is an issue of fact 
never stipulated to by the parties. Accordingly, Respondents' 
statements (see pp. 2 and 7 of Respondents' Brief) are incorrect 
that all the facts were stipulated to or otherwise not in dispute. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
MILLER & VIELE IS NOT BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF 
LIMITATION FROM INTERPOSING DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF DYE'S TAX 
TITLE TO THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF MINERAL INTEREST BECAUSE 
MILLER & VIELE WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF 
MINERAL INTEREST WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS PRIOR TO THE INTER-
POSITION OF ITS DEFENSES IN THIS LAWSUIT TO DYE'S TAX TITLE. 
A. Analysis of and Reply to Respondents' Arguments. 
The lower court, on summary judgment, held that Miller & 
Viele was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation from 
interposing its defenses to Plaintiff Dye's alleged tax title to 1 
the disputed one-half (~) mineral interest. This decision, of 
course, was rendered without hearing any argument or considering 
any evidence with respect to the validity of Dye's tax title or 
the relative priority of the parties' interests in the disputed 
one-half mineral interest. Nor have the parties stipulated as to · 
who holds valid title to the one-half mineral interest in dispute. 
The validity of Dye's tax title would be the ultimate question to 
be decided, but is not the subject matter of this appeal. 
On an appeal from a summary judgment, the facts are to be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant. ~. Whitma!0; 
W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P. 2d 918 (1964); Thompson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964). Since there , 
has not yet been any judicial determination as to the validity or 
relative priority of the parties' claimed interests in this one· 
half mineral interest, it must be assumed on this appeal that the 
prior tax deed conveyance by Duchesne County to Dye in 1940 (see 
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p. 5 of Appellant's Brief; R-231) did not vest any interest in 
Dye to the subject property; it must also be assumed that Dye 
obtained his interest in the subject property from the 1946 
conveyance from Miller & Viele when Miller & Viele reserved to 
itself the disputed one-half mineral interest (see pp. 4-5 of 
Appellant's Brief; and p. 5 of Respondents' Brief; R-73; 233). 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, however, have assumed throughout 
their Brief that it has already been judicially established that 
Plaintiff Dye's tax deed is valid. Respondents claim that this 
case does not deal with a severed mineral interest (see p. 12 of 
Respondents' Brief); Respondents claim that "the undivided one-
half mineral interest has never been severed from the surface 
estate obtained by Duchesne County at the tax sale" (Respondents' 
Brief at p. 12). Accordingly, Respondents' argument on this 
appeal rests on a finding never made or even considered by the 
lower court: the validity and relative priority of Plaintiff 
Dye's tax title obtained from Duchesne County. The lower court 
did not hold nor could it have so held that the mineral estate in 
question has not been severed from the surface estate. Such a 
holding would require a finding that Dye's alleged tax title, 
rather than Miller & Viele's title to the NW%NE%, was the valid 
title with priority; because, if Miller & Viele's title is the 
valid title with priority, then when Miller & Viele conveyed the 
surface estate and one-half of the mineral rights to Dye's 
predecessors in interest in 1946, while reserving to itself the 
disputed one-half mineral interest, the disputed one-half mineral 
interest was in fact severed! 
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The question on appeal is whether Miller & Viele was in 
actual possession of the disputed mineral interest within four 
(4) years prior to the interposition of its defenses in this lu 
suit to Dye's tax title. The tax title Statutes of Limitation 
clearly provide that, being in actual possession of the disputed 
mineral interests, Miller & Viele is entitled to interpose its 
defenses to the validity of Dye's alleged tax title and have a 
judicial determination, following an evidentiary hearing, of ~e 
validity of that tax title. This is all that Miller & Viele 
seeks from this Court on appeal. 
Respondents admit in their Brief that the only land interest 
in question in this case is the disputed one-half mineral interest 
and not the surface estate of the subject property or the remaini:' 
one-half mineral interest (see Respondents' Brief at p. 7, and 
pp. 3-6). Yet Respondents argue in their Brief that the "actual 
possession" concerned with in the instant case is actual possessk 
constituting such acts as cultivating or improving land, protectfa, 
land by substantial enclosure, using land for fuel, timber, 
pastureage, or expending five (5) dollars per acre in labor or 
money to erect or maintain irrigation works (see p. 11 of Respond<: 
Brief) . Obviously, none of those acts could even possibly constit.' 
actual possession of a one-half mineral interest. Respondents' 
claim that actual possession requires pedis possessio (foothold 
on the land, an actual entry, a possession in fact, a standing 
upon it, an occupation of it, as a real, demonstrative act done. 
Seep. 11 of Respondents' Brief). Appellants agree. Pedis 
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possessio of a mineral estate is obtained by withdrawing the 
mineral and taking control at the wellhead. Kanawha and Hocking 
Coal and Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1975) 
(discussed in detail hereinafter). 
That Respondents are confused as to what must be "actually 
possessed" is further evident from their statements on pages 12 
and 13 and elsewhere in their Brief, where they argue that Miller 
& Viele has admitted that it was never in actual occupancy or 
possession of the NW\NE\, which they assert includes the unsevered 
and undivided one-half mineral interest. Miller & Viele obviously 
does not need to be in possession of the NW\NE\, since that is 
not the property in dispute in this case. Again, as indicated in 
the Statement of Facts in Appellant's initial Brief (pp. 4-5), 
and as admitted in the parties' Stipulation and Respondents' 
brief (p. 5), in 1946 Miller & Viele conveyed to Plaintiff Dye's 
predecessors in interest all but the disputed one-half mineral 
interest. Miller & Viele certainly does not claim any interest 
in the surf ace and one-half mineral estate that it conveyed to 
Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest. 
Pursuant to the possession exception in the applicable 
Statutes of Limitations for tax titles, Miller & Viele must be in 
possession not of the surface estate of the NW\NE\, but of the 
one-half mineral interest only which is the only property in 
dispute. Respondents admit that the only property in question on 
this appeal is the subsurface mineral interest (see Respondents' 
Brief p. 7), yet they contradict themselves by continually making 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reference to and arguing that Miller & Viele must be in possessic 
of the surface estate (see~. pp. 11 and 12 of Respondents' 
Brief). In arguing that Miller & Viele must be in possession of 
the surface estate, Respondents are arguing with their own admitt, 
facts that the only property in dispute in this case is the one-
half mineral interest. 
There is absolutely no question that Miller & Viele, througn 
its lessee, Chevron Oil, has in fact been in actual possession of 
the minerals. We have the oil and gas l Respondents have admitte 
that Chevron Oil, Miller & Viele's lessee, has in fact for the 
past four (4) years extracted oil and gas from the common source 
of supply underlying the subject and surrounding properties (see 
Respondents' Brief at p. 6 and compare with Appellant's Brief at 
p. 7). 
It is of absolutely no consequence that the Chevron well is 
located on property adjacent to the surface property allegedly 
conveyed to Dye by tax deed from Duchesne County. The appropriat1 
Utah State governmental agency has duly made findings of fact and 
issued an order making it clear that the Chevron well has been 
producing and will continue to produce from a "common pool" of 
oil and gas for a six hundred and forty (640) acre area which 
includes the disputed one-half mineral interest (see pp. 6, 12, 
and 14 of Appellant's Brief). Based upon these findings, it 
makes no difference, notwithstanding Respondents' argument on 
page 13 of their Brief, whether the Chevron well was or was not a 
directional slanted well drilled from its adjacent location into 
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the minerals located under the surface property which Dye alleges 
he received by tax deed conveyance from Duchesne County. It is a 
simple fact that you cannot drain half of a lake. When pumping 
oil and gas from a common pool the oil and gas, which is located 
under the surface of the property Plaintiff Dye claims to have 
received by tax title conveyance from Duchesne County, is going 
to be withdrawn and therefore possessed at the wellhead. The 
Utah Board of Oil and Gas Conservation so found in its Findings 
of Fact and Order set forth in Appellant's initial Brief (pp. 6, 
12 and 14), which fact is admitted by Respondents (Respondents' 
Brief at p. 6). There is no basis for the Respondents to argue 
that Chevron Oil Company, Miller & Viele's lessee, was not in 
possession of the oil and gas and therefore the mineral estate so 
as to fall within the exception set forth in the applicable 
Statutes of Limitation for tax titles. 
Respondents question whether possession by the lessee 
constitutes possession by the lessor (seep. 8 of Respondents' 
Brief). Respondents do not, however, cite any cases or other 
authority for their position. On the other hand, Miller & Viele, 
on page 11 in its initial Brief, cited numerous cases supporting 
the universal rule of law that "possession of a tenant is that of 
his landlord." See also,~· Edgeller v. Johnston, 262 P.2d. 
1006, 1011 (Idaho 1953); Cusic v. Givens, 215 P.1d. 297, 298 
(Idaho 1950); 49 Am. Jur. 2d. Section 1, "Landlord and Tenant". 
Respondents further argue, on page 22 of their Brief, that 
as a matter of policy, Chevron "should not be considered to be in 
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possession of the undivided one-half mineral interest in the 
NWl..NEl... II I . R 
-.. -.. n so arguing, espondents again err in assuming that 
the disputed one-half mineral interest is undivided. As indicate 
above, it must be assumed on this appeal that the mineral interei 
in dispute was severed at the time Miller & Viele conveyed to 
Dye's predecessors the NW\NE~, except for the one-half mineral 
interest now in dispute. 
In addition, Respondents argue that even though Chevron has 
possession of the oil and gas at the wellhead, Chevron is in 
possession in its capacity as operator of the drilling unit 
rather than as Miller & Viele' s lessee (see Respondents' Brief at 
p. 22). Respondents then argue that it would be inequitable and 
contrary to the purpose of statutes of limitation generally to 
allow Miller & Viele to claim its possession pursuant to the 
exceptions in the statutes of limitation for tax titles by the 
"fortuitous fluke of circumstances" in which Chevron, as Miller! 
Viele's lessee, became the operator of the drilling unit establid 
by the Utah Board of Oil & Gas Conservation (see Respondents' 
Brief at p. 22). In so arguing, Respondents fail to realize that 
Chevron became a party to the pooling agreement in the first 
instance in that it claims and holds a lease-hold interest from 
Miller & Viele in the disputed one-half mineral interest. In 
making this argument, it is evident that Respondents' real point 
of contention is with the tax title Statutes of Limitation themse' 
While Respondents may feel that the tax title Statutes of LimHatl 
are ill-advised in providing the exception they do to the runnin' 
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of the Statutes, the Statutes as passed by the Utah Legislature 
are the prevailing applicable law in Utah, and those statutes 
clearly provide an exception to the running of the limitation 
time period when the one interposing defenses to a tax title has 
actually been in possession of the property interest in dispute 
within four (4) years prior to the interposition of the defenses 
to the tax title. Nowhere in the Statutes does it say that 
actual possession of disputed property by fortuitous circumstances 
does not fall within the exception set forth therein. 
In addition, it is totally irrelevant and immaterial for 
Respondents to argue that notwithstanding its actual possession 
of the disputed one-half mineral interst, Miller & Viele should 
not be afforded the opportunity to challenge the validity of the 
tax title "forty-six years after creation of the title" (see 
Respondents' Brief at p. 23). This in fact is exactly what the 
tax title Statutes of Limitation contemplate. There is no 
provision in those Statutes of Limitation to the effect that the 
possession exception does not apply after a certain passage of 
time. All that is required is actual possession of the property 
in dispute within four (4) years prior to the interposition of 
defenses to the tax title. Respondents' argument that we ignore 
the statutes simply is not a viable alternative in this case. 
Respondents also argue, on page 23 of their Brief, that "it 
is inconceivable that a sophisticated mortgage banking company 
such as Miller & Viele would not have paid property taxes on the 
NW\NE\ from 1928 to 1946 or investigated the reasons for not 
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having been assessed if they really thought they owned the prope; 
Again, however, there has been absolutely no judicial determi-
nation or even investigation into the actual ownership of or 
title to the property in question. It is not known at this point 
whether Dye's tax title is valid, or, if so, whether it has 
priority over or is subordinate to Miller & Viele's mortgage 
foreclosure interest in the subject property. Respondents evident. 
want to argue on appeal who has the actual ownership of the 
subject property and who thought they had ownership of the subjec 
property. This is exactly what Miller & Viele desires and seeks: 
A remand to the trial court for determination by that court, 
following trial, of the validity of Dye's alleged tax title and 
the relative priority of the parties' claimed interests. 
Respondents also miss the point when they argue on page 23 
of their Brief that it would be injustice if 
Miller & Viele might now be allowed to reap the benefits of 
the land when it was Dye's predecessors in interest who paia 
all property taxes levied and assessed upon the land since 
1927, and who have actually possessed, improved, and main-
tained the NW~NE~ since 1940. 
Respondents, in making this statement, completely ignore their 
own stipulated facts that Miller & Viele is not claiming any 
interest in the NW~NE~ except for the disputed one-half mineral 
interest. Miller & Viele is not seeking any benefit from the 
surface of the land nor would Miller & Viele have paid any such 
property taxes on the land, since in 1946 Miller & Viele itself 
conveyed all but the disputed one-half mineral interest to 
Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest. In addition, this 
-12-
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again is an argument to be made before the trial court at trial, 
and not in this Court on appeal, since it deals with whether 
Miller & Viele ~as title to the disputed one-half mineral interest 
or whether Dye has title to the same through his purported tax 
title. 
It should also be noted that Respondents' argument that 
Chevron never participated in the motions for summary judgment 
nor the appeal (page 23 of Respondents' Brief), has no bearing 
whatsoever on the issue on appeal. In fact, this argument further 
underscores Respondents' apparent confusion in believing that 
there has been a determination of who owns title to the disputed 
one-half mineral interest or that that issue is somehow on appeal 
before this Court. This is a further indication of the need to 
remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the 
validity of Dye's purported tax title with respect to Miller & 
Viele's mortgage foreclosure title. Miller & Viele notes, however, 
for the record, that in an effort to minimize litigation expense 
and delay, Chevron Oil simply tendered to Miller & Viele a defense 
of Miller & Viele's position regarding ownership of the disputed 
one-half mineral interest. 
With respect to Section 40-6-6(f), Appellants have not, as 
Respondents claim on page 18 of their Brief, miscontrued that 
section. Section 40-6-6(f) states: "In the absence of voluntary 
pooling, .. [o]perations incident to the drilling of a well 
upon any portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be 
deemed for all purposes to be the conduct of such operations upon 
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each separately owned tract in the unit by the several owners 
thereof [emphasis added]." Although the parties "voluntarily" 
agreed to enter into the Communitization Agreement, they were 
actually and in fact forced to enter into said Agreement because 
of the drilling order establishing the six hundred forty (640) 
acre tract as a single drilling unit. 
Al so, it is important to note that the intent of the drafter 
of Section 40-6-6(f) has been carried forth, preserved, and 
agreed to in Paragraph 8 of the Communitization Agreement (see 
Appellant's Brief at pp. 13, 14, and 19). The parties themselve1 
including Respondent Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc., have agree1 
and dictated that the production of the oil and gas from the 
Chevron well constitutes production of the oil and gas from each 
of the lands comprising the six hundred forty ( 640) acre drillini 
unit. This Agreement parallels the findings of the Utah Board oi 
Oil and Gas Conservation that there is a pool of gas and oil 
common to the entire six hundred forty ( 640) acres, including the 
disputed one-half mineral interest property from which Chevron, 
as Miller & Viele's lessee, is extracting oil and gas. 
B. Inapplicability of Respondents' Authorities as Suppon 
For Their Position. 
The few authorities cited by Respondents in their Brief 
either clearly support Appellant's position or are distinguishabl: 
and not on point with the facts or issues in the instant case. 
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In Kanawha and Hocking Coal and Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 
535 P. 2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1975), cited on Page 11 of Respondents' 
Brief, the Court held that there was no actual possession of the 
severed mineral estate where there was no actual possession of 
the bed through mining and extraction. This case clearly supports 
Appellant's position. Applying Kanawha to the instant case, 
there is no actual possession of the mineral estate where there 
is no actual possession of the oil or gas. In the instant case, 
Appellant in fact has been in actual possession of the oil and 
gas from the mineral interest in dispute and therefore is in 
actual possession of the mineral estate. Appellant has been in 
possession of this oil and gas within four (4) years prior to the 
initiation of this action and interposition herein of its defenses 
to Dye's alleged tax title; consequently, the Appellant falls 
within the exception expressly set forth in the tax title Statutes 
of Limitation and now, therefore, Appellant should be given its 
day in court to challenge the validity of Dye's alleged tax title 
at trial. 
Respondents' statement that the lower court found Dixon v. 
American Liberty Oil Co., 77 So.2d 533, 538, 4 Oil and Gas 17, 21 
0954), to be "so convincing in ruling in plaintiffs' favor" is 
totally unsubstantiated (see Respondents' Brief at p. 14). There 
are absolutely no findings by the lower court with respect to the 
court's application of that case to the instant case. In addition, 
Respondents' citation of that case in hopeful support of their 
own position, evidences the misunderstanding of Respondents with 
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respect to the actual issues on appeal before this Court. As 
indicated on pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's initial Brief, the 
court in Dixon rejected the claims of the operator of an oil and 
gas well located on pooled lands to adverse possession over all 
the lands of the pooled area by virtue of its operation of and 
control of the well. In rejecting that argument, and in holding 
that each mineral lessee of land within the pooled area was in 
possession of its own respective leasehold interests, the court 
again stated that 
the drilling and production of oil from a unitized 
area constitutes an exercise and user of mineral 
rights throughout the entire unit and operates as 
a substitute for performance of drilling obligations 
contained in a mineral lease [4 Oil and Gas Reporter 
at 22]. 
Al though Respondents' argument is less than clear, they are 
apparently taking the position that since the court in Dixon he!~ 
that the well operator could not adversely possess the mineral 
interests of lease holders of property within the pooled area, 
Chevron Oil in the instant case, as the well operator of the 
pooling unit, was not in possession of minerals extracted from 
its own leased land within the six hundred forty (640) acre areal 
This argument not only does not follow from the Court's holding 
in Dixon, but in fact just the opposite: Dixon stands for the 
proposition that each holder of a lease covering lands within the 
pooled area is in actual possession of its minerals as extracted 
by the well operator for the pooled area. Chevron, therefore, ai 
Miller & Viele' s lessee of the NWli;NEli;, is in actual possession of 
-16-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the oil and gas from the NW~NE~, through its efforts as operator 
of the one well allowed on the six hundred forty (640) acre 
drilling unit. 
In citing Dixon as support for their position, Respondents 
also evidence once again their confusion of the issue on appeal 
in the instant case. The lower court in the instant case did not 
hold, as Respondents claim the court did in Dixon, that "the 
mineral estate could not be thought of as separate from the 
surface estate, since both estates were owned by the same party 
and had not been severed" (see p. 15 of Respondents' Brief). As 
discussed in detail above, there has not yet been any judicial 
decision as to the validity of the parties' respective claimed 
titles or severance of the mineral estate. The fact that Respondents 
rest their argument on a finding that the lower court never made 
or even considered (that Dye's tax title is valid), simply 
underscores the necessity of remanding this case to the trial 
court for determination of which of the parties' respective 
titles and interests are valid and have priority. 
The only applicable holding in Dixon to the instant case is 
the one set forth in Appellant's initial Brief, pages 16 and 17, 
showing that the court in Dixon explicitly held that drilling and 
production of oil from a unitized area constitutes an exercise and 
~of mineral rights throughout the entire unit, but that such 
acts are not sufficient to evict other interest holders of land 
in the pooled area. The reason is obvious; there is no notice or 
hostility that is required for purposes of adverse possession. 
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The Respondents also cite R. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and 
Gas 124 (1971) (see p. 14 of Respondents' Brief) as standing for 
the persuasive rule that removal of oil and gas from under a 
tract of land by means of a well located on adjacent or nearby 
tracts, even if included in the same production unit, is insuffi· 
cient to constitute actual possession of the mineral estate. It 
is important to note, however, that this statement extracted by 
Respondents was made in the context of determining whether oil 
and gas was being adversely possessed. Specifically, removal of 
oil and gas from under a tract of land by means of a well locate( 
on an adj a cent tract in the same production unit is not sufficien 
to constitute possession so as to satisfy the requirements for 
adverse possession. The citation from Hemingway which Respondent 
cite in their Brief, refers in footnote to the case of Brizzolan 
Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W. 2d 728 (1949). The footnote 
explicitly states that the result in this case was based upon 
"lack of notice" thus eliminating the hostility requirement for 
adverse possession. There was no actual possession sufficient to 
satisfy the adverse possession statute because possession by 
drilling on an adjacent tract of land does not provide the necesi: 
notice and is not open and notorious nor hostile as required by 
the elements for adverse possession. Accordingly, this statement 
from Hemingway cited by the Respondents is irrelevant and immater 
to the instant case. 
Respondents also rely upon Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 
339 P.2d 1019 (1959) (seep. 15 of Respondents' Brief). The 
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facts in Chase are completely distinguishable from the facts in 
the instant case. The issue in Chase was whether undetached 
minerals are part of the earth and therefore realty. In other 
words, are oil and gas leases included within the term "real 
estate"? That case is not applicable since in the instant case, 
the minerals are detached as they are extracted by Chevron Oil. 
Oil and gas is pumped and actually possessed by the Appellant at 
the wellhead. What constitutes actual possession of a mineral 
estate was not even at issue in the Chase case. 
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351, 
31 Oil and Gas 215 (10th Cir. 1968), cited by Respondents on page 
16 of their Brief, also deals exclusively with actual possession 
in terms of the absence of the hostility requirement. In that 
case, the court stressed the elements of adverse possession: 
Actual, visible, physical, exclusive, hostile, and continuous 
possession. The court stated that when any of the elements is 
missing no title by adverse possession can be obtained. The 
court then held that the Appellants had not met all of the 
requirements of the adverse possession statute and the title was 
quieted in the Respondent. 
In attaching to their Brief Findings of Fact 10 through 19 
from the Pan American case (seep. 3 of appendix to Respondents' 
Brief), Respondents make clear the fact that this is an adverse 
possession case turning on the issue of a lack of notice and 
hostility. Contrary to the statement made by the Respondents on 
page 16 their Brief to the effect that the case did not turn on 
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the elements of notice or hostility, but rather lack of actual 
possession, paragraph 17 of the Findings of Fact clearly states 
that the plaintiffs were not aware of the wells there involved o: 
that they owned the land involved, nor were they aware of any of 
the proceedings relative to the quiet title suit, in that plaint: 
did not discover that they could assert any of the claims assert< 
therein until they were joined as parties-defendant. This findi:. 
of fact led the court to conclude that there was no actual posse;
1 
because of lack of notice since the drilling was being perform~ 
on land adjacent to the land in question. Accordingly, the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law cited by Respondents ~ 
their Brief fail to support Respondents' conclusion. 
Finally, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 
(10th Cir. 1954), cited by Respondents on Page 16 of their 
Brief, is also distinguishable on its facts and has absolutelyno 
relevance to the issue on appeal. In Phillips, the court held 
that the rule of perpetuities, which was at issue in the case, 
was not violated by unitization because unitization affects 
allocation of production and the computation of royalties, but 
not cross-transfers or royalty interests. This is obviously 
totally irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
Also at issue in Phillips was whether the unitization 
provisions in the oil and gas leases were sufficient to grant 
authority to the lessee, as lessor's agent, to enter into a unit 
plan for development and operation, and to make a future contract 
to effectuate such plans. The court held that the unitization 
-20-
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agreements were sufficient to grant authority to the lessee to 
enter into a unit plan so long as the lessee acted in good faith, 
with due rega~d for the lessor's interests, and provided for fair 
apportionment of the oil produced. It is evident that this issue 
is also totally irrelevant to the facts and issue in the instant 
case. The question of actual possession of the mineral estate 
was never at issue in Phil lips. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF DYE'S PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST ACQUIESCED IN 
MILLER & VIELE'S TITLE TO THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF MINERAL 
INTEREST BY SOLICITING AND ACCEPTING THE 1946 DEED IN WHICH 
THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF MINERAL INTEREST WAS RESERVED TO 
MILLER & VIELE. 
In response to Point Two of Appellant's argument in its 
initial brief, Respondents admit the question of fact that must 
yet be determined by the trier of fact. 
In their argument, Respondents correctly observe that the 
1946 deed conveying Miller & Viele's interest to Plaintiff Dye's 
predecessors in interest in the surface and one-half of the 
mineral estate of the NW!i;NV!; was entitled "Quit-claim deed 
(special) , " but, in the words of counsel for Respondents, 
"strangely enough, contains words of warranty" (see Respondents' 
Brief at p . 2 5) . 
After correctly making that observation, however, Respondents 
conclude on pages 25 and 26 of their Brief that "[i] t is obvious 
that a standard form 'Warranty Deed (Special)' was used from 
which the words 'warranty' were struck from the title of the 
document in words of grant". Respondents then conclude: 
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The words 'Quit-Claim' were interlineated in 
both the title and words of grant, demonstrating 
that both parties desire that the instrument 
evidence a quitclaim of the NW\NE\ [Respondents' 
Brief at p. 26]. 
While the document itself is obviously some evidence of the 
intent of the parties, it is not sufficient evidence in and of 
itself for this Court to determine what the actual intention of 
the parties was with respect to that conveyance. The actual 
intention of the parties involved can only be ascertained from 
evidence heard by the trial court at trial. It is not suffici~ 
for Respondents to merely conclude that "it is obvious" that the 
parties intended to convey Miller & Viele's interest in the 
surface and one-half mineral estate by means of a quit claim deei 
as opposed to a Warranty deed. The only way proper determinatior 
can be made of this factual issue is for the case to be remanded 
to the trial court for consideration of that issue which the 
trial court previously refused to consider. 
In that regard, it is extremely significant that in the case 
of Wallace v. Build Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965) 
(cited by Respondents on page 26 of their Brief for the principal 
that a quitclaim deed does not imply the conveyance of any partk1 
interest in the property) , this Court stated as follows with 
respect to whether Plaintiff breached the contract evidenced by 
the quitclaim deed in question: 
We are quite in accord with the Defendant's 
contention that the various dealings of the 
parties should be considered together [402 
P. 2d at 700]. 
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The court then listed all the evidentary facts before the 
trial court supporting the trial court's decision that the 
Plaintiff did not breach the contract evidenced by the quitclaim 
deed. In the instant case, of course, the trial court did not 
consider any evidence at all; consequently, the Respondents have 
no support of any kind for their conclusion that the compromise 
and agreement between the parties in 1946 did not constitute an 
acquiescence on the part of Dye's predecessors in interest to 
Miller & Viele's title in the subject property. 
Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the trial court 
for further discovery and trial on the issue of whether a compromise 
and settlement was actually reached between Plaintiff Dye's 
predecessors in interest and Miller & Viele as evidenced by the 
solicitation and acceptance of the 1946 Miller & Viele deed to 
the subject property. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that Respondents' 
statement made several times in its Brief, that all of the facts 
in the instant case have been stipulated to, simply is not true 
(see Respondents' Brief at pp. 2 and 7). There has not been any 
stipulation whatsoever with respect to the acquiescence by 
Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest to Miller & Viele's 
title to the subject property or with respect to a compromise and 
settlement having been reached in 1946. Accordingly, Miller & 
Viele takes exception to Respondents' statements to the effect 
that all the facts have been stipulated to. They simply have 
not. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents' Brief and argument are based upon the mistaken 
premise that the alleged tax title of Plaintiff Dye is valid and 
has priority over Miller & Viele' s mortgage foreclosure interest. 
The lower court, however, never determined or even considered 
this issue in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the appeal issue of the Statutes of Limitation. In addition, 
the authorities cited by Respondents clearly are not on point 
with the real issue on appeal in the instant case, with the 
exception only of the Kanawha and Dixon cases, which actually 
support Appellant's position. 
Miller & Viele, through its lessee, Chevron, is in actual 
possession of the disputed one-half mineral interest. Chevron, 
since 1974, has continuously extracted the oil and gas from the 
common source of supply for the entire six hundred and forty 
( 640) acre pooling unit, including the NWli;NEJi;. We have the oil 
and gas and therefore actual possession of the disputed mineral 
interest. Miller & Viele therefore comes within the "actual 
possession" exception in the tax title Statutes of Limitation. 
Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the trial court for 
trial on the issue of the validity and relative priority of the 
parties' respective titles to the disputed one-half mineral 
interest. 
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There also remains for trial the factual determination of 
whether the predecessors in interest to Plaintiff Dye's alleged 
tax title reached a compromise and settlement with Miller & Viele 
in 1946 whereby Dye's predecessors acquiesced in Miller & Viele's 
title to the one-half mineral interest now in dispute while 
receiving from Miller & Viele undisputed title to the other one-
half mineral interest and the surface estate of the NW~NE~. 
Respectively submitted: 
McMURRAY, McINTOSH, BUTLER & NIELSEN 
By: 
and 
By: 
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